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Advances in supermodular optimization have resulted in the development of 
a methodological breakthrough called supermodular games. In 
supermodular games, an increase in a player’s strategy leads to increases in 
other players’ strategies as well Despite mathematical rigor, they can 
effectively characterize various kinds of non-cooperative situations. 
Supermodular games are based on monotone comparative statics which in 
turn relies heavily on lattice theory. This paper gives a theoretical overview 
of monotone comparative statics – including a comparison with traditional 
comparative statics – and supermodular optimization, and offers an example 
of supermodular games.  
Keywords: Monotone comparative statics, lattice theory, supermodularity, supermodular games 
JEL Classification: C72, C73, C61 
1 University of Joensuu, Economics and Business Administration, Faculty of Law, Economics and Business 
Administration, P.O. Box 111, 80101 Joensuu, Finland. E-mail: arno.reichenvater@joensuu.fi 
21. Introduction 
Supermodular optimization is a relatively new methodology that can be used to conduct 
comparative statics or sensitivity analysis. The theory of supermodular optimization can determine 
how changes in exogenous parameters affect endogenous variables in optimizing models  
(Amir, 2005). It relies heavily on assumptions on monotonicity conclusions and does away with 
assumptions associated with the classical method that imposes the Implicit Function Theorem, 
smoothness, interiority and concavity. Monotone relationships are vital for empirical economic 
research. For instance, the linear regression model makes sense only in the context of monotone 
comparative statics. Monotone comparative statics is linked to complementarity, complementary 
relationships being a common phenomenon in social sciences. From this standpoint, it is essential 
that an appropriate tool is used to verify the existence of complementary relationships since 
complementarity can be formalized by the notion of supermodularity. 
Supermodular optimization has extended into a methodological breakthrough called supermodular 
games which are also known as games with strategic complementarities. The pioneering work in 
this field was done by Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). The reaction 
curves in such games are monotonic. This reflects the complementarity of the actions of both an 
agent and his rivals (Amir, 2005). Due to the existence of the Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, this 
guarantees a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). As the PSNE is often a desired economic 
result, supermodular optimization increases the power of game-theoretic modelling. Vives (1990) 
shows that supermodularity in strategies is a sufficient condition for the existence of a PSNE. If one 
player’s strategy increases point-wise, the best response strategies of all other players must also 
increase point-wise. This condition applies in games in which all players’ payoff functions are 
supermodular in actions. In addition, supermodularity is often the relevant notion in the 
comparative statics of Nash equilibrium points. Amir (2005) argues that supermodular games are 
more conducive to predictable comparative statics properties than games with continuous best-
responses.
Supermodular games have been to describe various situations. Diamond (1982) uses the concept of 
supermodular games in his search model. Vives (2000) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that 
since a firm’s price elasticity of demand is increasing in the rivals’ prices, there is a unique pure-
strategy equilibrium so that the Bertrand oligopoly is dominance solvable. Similar results exist for 
the Cournot duopoly. Furthermore, Amir and Wooders (2000) conclude that in the standard two-
3period R&D game with one-way spill-overs and product market competition the theory of 
supermodular games are also applicable. 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly introduce monotone comparative statics and supermodular 
games using lattice theory. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the concept of 
monotone comparative statics and delves into topics related to it: lattice theory, supermodularity, 
and Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem. Monotone comparative statics is then compared to the 
traditional comparative statics. Section 3 introduces a class of games called supermodular games 
and its solution concept. Section 4 concludes the review. 
2. Monotone Comparative Statics 
Traditional methods for comparative statics in economics are usually based on the Implicit Function 
Theorem and first-order conditions or the duality theory. These are done with certain conditions –
convexity of sets, smoothness of indifference curves, derivative conditions that ensure interior 
solutions, second derivative conditions and linearity of budget sets or objective functions – in place. 
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) argue that these conditions merely serve the method and often cannot 
be a basis for meaningful comparative statics conclusions. To enforce this statement, they suppose 
that g  is a discontinuous function that is increasing and has an increasing inverse. In addition, let 
)(xgy  .
This leads to a parameterized problem 
 ),(max txf  ..ts Sx ,
which is equivalent to the problem 
 ),(max tyh  ..ts  )(Sgy
where )),((),( 1 tygftyh  . As g  is an order-preserving transformation, )(tx  is non-decreasing 
if and only if ))(()( txgty    is non-decreasing. The transformed problem is not smooth, linear or 
convex in the choice of variable x , unlike the original problem. 
4Monotone comparative statics, on the other hand, is largely concerned with statements about order: 
an increase in a variable leads to an increase in another variable. Therefore, the mathematical tools 
used are somewhat different – the appropriate tool is lattice theory supported by Tarski’s fixed point 
theorem, both being non-topological. In monotone comparative statics an order is necessary for 
both the set of constraints and the set of maximizers. 
2.1. Lattice Theory 
Since the first mention of lattices by Boole (1847), lattice theory has played an increasingly 
significant role in various applications in economics and other social sciences. In the last 30 years, 
the theory of stable matching has developed in leaps and bounds (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 
1990) alongside the developments in the theory of the allocation of discrete resources. A major 
result of this has been that in nearly all the cases where a stable matching exists, the set of these 
matchings is a lattice for a natural order (Monjardet, 2003). Fleiner (2003) has proven that Tarski’s 
fixed point theorem on lattices leads to several existence and structure theorems. Other applications 
of the lattice theory include cluster analysis (Janowitz, 1995; Domenach and Leclerc, 2004), data 
analysis (Duquenne, 1999), experimental designs (Duquenne, 1986), game theory (Faigle and Kern, 
1992; Bilbao, 2000) and revealed preference theory (Koshevoy, 1999). 
Let X  denote a partially ordered set2, with its order relation t  being reflexive ( xx t  for all 
Xx ), transitive (if yx t  and zy t , then zx t ) and anti-symmetric (if yx t  and xy t , then 
yx  ). For Xyx , , let yx   denote the least upper bound, also called join, of Xyx , , if it 
exists. Similarly, let yx   denote the greatest lower bound, or meet, of Xyx , , if it exists. The 
set X  is a lattice if for Xyx ,  there exists yx   and xy   that are both are elements of the set 
X . A subset S  is a sublattice of X  if S  is closed under yx   and yx  . It is complete if for 
every nonempty subset 'S  of S , both )'inf(S  and )'sup(S  exist and are elements of S  (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990).
In words, a lattice is a partially ordered set whose nonempty finite subsets all have a supremum 
(join) and an infimum (meet). A sublattice S  of a lattice X  is a nonempty subset of a set X . For 
example, under the usual ordering on 2 , the set )}2,2(),1,0(),0,1(),0,0{( T  is a lattice but not a 
                                                
2 For a total order, anti-symmetry and transitivity hold. Reflexivity is replaced by totality, i.e., yx t  or xy t .
5sublattice of 2  because T  )1,1()1,0()0,1( . As another example, the real numbers is a lattice 
and any subset of the real numbers is also a lattice. 
Vives (2001) states, that “…any interval of the real line with the usual order is a lattice, since any 
two points have a supremum and an infimum in the interval”. For example, the set 2S ,
)}1,0(),0,1{( S , is not a lattice with the vector ordering. The reason for this is that )0,1(  and )1,0(
have no joint upper bound in S , as can be seen in Figure 1.1a. On the other hand, the set 
)}1,1(),1,0(),0,1(),0,0{(' S  is a lattice with a vector ordering (Figure 1.1b). 
A sublattice mathematically expresses a kind of technical complementarity. If a solution x  is 
chosen from a sublattice of n , then it means that increasing the value of some variable never 
prevents increasing the others as well. 
These definitions rely on the order t  on the underlying set X . Often X  is n  with the 
component-wise order with yx   denoting the component-wise minimum and yx   the 
component-wise maximum. Whenever X  is n , a bounded sublattice S  of X  is complete if and 
only if it is a compact set in the Euclidian topology (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Sometimes X
may be a product of lattices, for example, BAu . In these cases, the default specification is to use 
the product order so that )','(),( baba t  if 'aa t  in A  and 'bb t  in B .
Monotone comparative statics requires that both the set of constraints and the set of maximizers 






Figure 1.1a Figure 1.1b 
6given relation t , and with Z  and Y  elements of the power set )(XP , we have YZ Sd  ( “Y  is 
higher than Z ”) if for every Zz  and Yy  we have Zyz   and Yyz   (Milgrom and 
Shannon, 1994). If we have a partially ordered set T , the set-valued function )(: XPTM o  is 
monotone non-decreasing if 'tt d  implies that )'()( tMtM Sd .
It is worth noting that generally the strong set order is not reflexive. SS St  if and only if S  is a 
sublattice of X . The strong order set is transitive, however; the only exception is an empty set S
where SS S SØ dd .
Following Topkis (1976), a simple characterization of the structure of sublattices of n  in terms of 
a set of 2n  constraints can be used:  
Theorem 1: A subset S  of n  is a sublattice if and only if there exist )1( nn  functions 
o2:ijg )( ji z , each of which is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its 
second, and n  sets iS ),...,1( ni   such that { | ( , ) 0 1 } { | }ij i j i iS x g x x ij n x x S d  d d   .
Theorem 2: S  and 'S  are complete sublattices of X  such that 'SS St  if and only if there exists a 
complete sublattice R  of X  such that )}inf({ SxRS t  and )}sup({' SxRS d . Moreover, 
if S  and 'S  are complete sublattices with 'SS St , then 'SS   is a complete sublattice.
Regarding theorem 2, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) state that “one complete sublattice is higher 
than another if and only if the first consists of the part of some sublattice lying above some point 
))(inf(S  and the other consists of the part of the same sublattice lying below some other point 
))(sup(S ”. In addition, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) introduce additional concepts regarding single 
crossing of which the most critical is the following.  
Definition 1: Let X  be a lattice, T  a partially ordered set, and ouTXf : . Then f  satisfies 
the single crossing property in ),( tx  if for ''' xx !  and ''' tt ! , )'',''()'','( txftxf !  implies that 
)',''()','( txftxf !  and )'',''()'','( txftxf t  implies that )',''()','( txftxf t . If 
7)'',''()'','( txftxf t  implies that )',''()','( txftxf !  for every ''' tt ! , then f  satisfies the strict 
single crossing property in ),( tx .
The reason the term “single crossing property” is used is because ),(),'( txftxf   crosses zero only 
once when the conditions hold. This crossing occurs as incremental returns to x  cross zero from 
below, as a function of t  (Athey, 2001). The single crossing property also implies ordinality.
The single crossing property is required for the single crossing condition (SCC), which arises in 
many games with incomplete information (Athey, 2001). If a player’s strategy assigns higher 
actions to higher types, it is said to be non-decreasing. The SCC requires that player i ’s expected 
payoffs satisfy the Milgrom-Shannon single crossing property whenever each opponent j  uses a 
non-decreasing pure strategy. What follows is that for non-decreasing strategies of each j , the best 
response of i  is to choose a non-decreasing strategy. 
Definition 2: The single crossing condition in games with incomplete information (SCC) is satisfied 
if for each ni ,...,1 , whenever every opponent ij z  uses a strategy jjjj tt $o]',''[:D  that is 
non-decreasing, player i ’s objective function, ))(;,( iiii taU D , satisfies single crossing in );( ii ta .
(Athey, 2001). 
2.2. Increasing Differences, Supermodularity and Complementarity 
Lattice theory provides a formal foundation for the concepts of increasing differences and 
supermodularity, both of which formalize the idea of complementarity. Let us first cover increasing 




 in which ouTXf : , and we have a lattice X  with order relation t  and two subsets B and C. 
T  is a partially ordered set and XS  . )(tI  is the set of optimal solutions to the problem. This 
means that )),((maxarg)( txft Sx I .
8The correspondence I  is increasing from T  to S  if when 'tt t  and 'tt z , then )'()( tt II t . The 
correspondence is strongly increasing if 'tt t  and 'tt z  imply that 'ss t  for every s  in )(tI  and 
every 's  in )'(tI .
A function oXf :  is supermodular if )'()()'()'( xfxfxxfxxf t  for all Xxx ', . A 
function is supermodular if increasing one of its variables increases the returns to increasing each of 
the other variables (Athey, 2002). Thus, supermodularity represents complementary inputs. 
Increasing differences and supermodularity are closely related. As in supermodularity, the idea of 
increasing differences can be summed as “increasing one variable raises the return to increase 
another variable”. However, according to Vives (2001), supermodularity is a stronger property than 
increasing differences, and is more convenient mathematically whereas increasing differences has 
the desirable property of being more easily recognizable. Consider the function ouTXf : . If it 
is supermodular on X  and with increasing differences on TX u , it satisfies the complementarity 
properties. This, in turn, secures the monotonicity of the solutions )(tI  to the maximization 
problem ),(max txfSx
3.
2.3. Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem 
Following Topkis (1978), supermodularity can be characterized in differential terms for the smooth 
function case with Euclidean domains. 
Theorem 3 (Topkis’s Characterization Theorem): Let ],[ xxI   be an interval in n . Suppose that 
onf :  is twice differentiable on some open set containing I . Then f  is supermodular on I
if and only if  for all Ix  and all ji z , 0/2 tww ji xxf .
The assumptions of convexity or connectedness of the domain are not requirements of 
supermodularity – neither are convexity, concavity or differentiability of the function itself 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Instead, supermodularity uses only the order structure of the lattice. 
Two fundamental theorems regarding lattices are Tarski’s fixed point theorem and Topkis’s 
monotonicity theorem: 
                                                
3 See Vives (2001) for proof. 
9Theorem 4 (Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem): If X  is a complete lattice and XXf o:  is a non-
decreasing function, then f  has a fixed point. Moreover, the set of fixed points of f  has 
})(|sup{ xxfXx t  as its largest element and })(|inf{ xxfXx d  as its smallest element.
Tarski’s fixed-point theorem guarantees the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It can be 
visualized by thinking of a function f  from [0,1] to [0,1] (Vives, 2001). Imagine a graph of f
having 45° line as in figure 2.1. If function f  is increasing, it will cross the 45° line only once. 
Although the function may make several jumps, it will nevertheless cross the 45° line at some point. 
Unfortunately, this does not apply to decreasing functions: jumps in the function may lead to it 
never crossing the 45° line. In this case, no equilibrium exists. For further illustration, see figures 
2.1a and 2.1b. 
Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem (1978) can be defined as follows: 
Theorem 5 (Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem): Let X  be a lattice and T  a partially ordered set. 
Suppose ouTXyxf :),(  is supermodular in x  for given y  and has increasing differences in 
x  and y . Suppose that 'yy t  and that ),(maxarg yxfMx {  and )',(maxarg'' yxfMx { .
Then '' Mxx   and Mxx  ' . In particular (when 'yy  ), the set of maximizers of f  is a 
sublattice4.
                                                
4 For proof, see Topkis (1978). 
1 1
Figure 2.1a Figure 2.1b 
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The central idea behind Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem is that it rules out the possibility that the 
infimum is greater than the supremum. In addition, any function that has increasing differences in 
),( yx  also satisfies the single crossing property in ),( yx . Supermodularity and increasing 
differences are useful since they have a number of strong qualities (Milgrom & Shannon, 1994). For 
instance, they are easily characterized for smooth functions on n . Also, supermodularity is 
preserved under a number of operations. 
2.4. Monotone vs. Traditional Comparative Statics 
There are significant differences between traditional comparative statics and its monotone 
counterpart. In order to compare the two methods, the traditional approach is first reviewed. 
Consider the following problem (Amir, 2005): 
}|),(max{arg)( SYyyxfxy  
 .
In the problem, f  is smooth and the maxarg  is an interior. The first-order condition of this is 
0))(,(   xyxf x . As this is identity with respect to x , under the Implicit Function Theorem 
( 0xyf ), it can be differentiated with respect to x . Solving for 











assuming that 0txf  (i.e., increasing differences of f  in ),( yx ).
Hence, according to Topkis’s theorem (1978), there is no need for assumptions of concavity and 
smoothness of the objective function, interiority of the solution, and convexity of the feasible set. 
As Topkis’s theorem does not require an interiority of the solution, it needs the constraint to have an 
“ascendancy” property. This property ensures that the boundaries of the constraint set are increasing 
functions of the parameter. This, in turn, leads to the maxarg  partly lying on the boundary of the 
feasible set for some parameter values inheriting the monotonicity property. In other words, Topkis 
is able to dispense with concavity since if they fail locally, the maxarg  will be on the boundary and 
increasing by the parameter (Amir, 2005). 
11
Traditional comparative statics requires a unique maxarg  that does not stray against the constraint, 
and that remains smooth on the parameter. This leads to excessive reliance on concavity 
assumptions on objective functions, Inada-type conditions, and convexity of feasible sets. 
Sometimes there are no good reasons to accept such assumptions. Monotone comparative statics 
does not require the above mentioned assumptions. In addition, monotone comparative statics has 
the advantage of allowing the parameter set to be any partially ordered set (for instance, a set of 
integers), a set of sets ordered by inclusion, or even a set of partially ordered probability distribution 
(Amir, 2005). 
3. Supermodular Games 
Games that fall into the class of supermodular games have become increasingly important in 
economics, especially industrial organization. They are best described as games in which “…each 
player’s strategy set is partially ordered, the marginal returns to increasing one’s strategy rise with 
increases in the competitors’ strategies … and, if a player’s strategies are multidimensional, the 
marginal returns to any one component of the player’s strategy rise with increases in the other 
components” as stated in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).  
Although not taught in many graduate microeconomics or even all game theory courses, the class of 
supermodular games holds in several important economic applications in non-cooperative game 
theory. Supermodular games can be applied, for example, in macroeconomics to represent search 
models (Diamond, 1982) and rational expectations models (Bryant, 1983). Some games in 
oligopoly theory as well as games of new technologies (Dybvig and Spatt, 1983; Katz and Shapiro, 
1986) also qualify as supermodular games. Bayesian games offer yet another interesting playground 
for practitioners of supermodular games (see, for example, Shavell (1989) for a model of pre-trial 
negotiations). The Shavell example is a demonstration of a Bayesian game in which 
supermodularity relies on a particular structure of the specification of uncertainty (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990). 
An important characteristic of supermodular games (also known as games with strategic 
complementarities) is that they always contain pure strategy Nash equilibria. This is somewhat of a 
relief since randomized behaviour as demonstrated by mixed-strategies remains controversial in 
economic theory. The potential of these games is enormous since under certain conditions many 
models of oligopoly and macroeconomic coordination games become supermodular games (Amir, 
2005).
12
Additional applications of supermodular games are possible. It is important to notice that although 
supermodularity is a cardinal concept, analysis of supermodular games follows an ordinal approach. 
In other words, only inequalities among payoffs are used for pure strategy profiles (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990). 
3.1. Solution of Supermodular Games 
A normal form game with n players is represented by a triple ),,( iuSI * . I  is a finite or infinite 
set of n players. nS  is the strategy set available to the players Nn  such that nSSS uu ...1 . The 
typical element of each player’s strategy set nS  is ns  while ns  denotes competitors’ strategies. 
Thus, the complete strategy profile is Ssss nn   ),( . u  is a payoff function that can be 
represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function oSui : . Following Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990), the game’s solution is as follows. 
The game is supermodular if the following conditions hold for all Nn :
(A1)  The strategy set S  is a complete lattice. 
(A2) nu  is supermodular in ns  (for fixed ns ).
(A3) nu  has increasing differences in ns  and ns .
(A4)  }{: foSun  is order upper semi-continuous in ns  (for fixed ns ) and order 
continuous in ns  (for fixed ns ) and has a finite upper bound. 
Often the above conditions can be checked by using the theorem below that closely resembles the 
above conditions. 
Theorem 6: Suppose the number of players is finite, that the typical strategy for each player n  is 
nk
nnj kjs  ),...,1;(  and that the ordering is component-wise. Then, *  is supermodular if 
assumptions (A1’) – (A4’) hold:
(A1’) nS  is an interval in n
k : }|{],[ nnnnn ysysyyS dd  .
(A2’) nu  is twice continuously differentiable on nS .
(A3’) 0/2 twww njnin ssu  for all n  and for all nkji dd1 . 
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(A4’) 0/2 twww mjnin ssu  for all mn z , nki dd1  and mkj dd1 . 
The main characteristic of supermodular games follows directly from Topkis’s monotonicity 
theorem. Each player’s best-response correspondence has extremal selections that are increasing in 
each rival’s strategy, is . Therefore, the overall best response mapping has extremal selections that 
are increasing. The existence of a fixed point in either of these selections is a result from Tarski’s 
fixed-point theorem. A fixed point implies a pure strategy equilibrium – a Nash equilibrium. 
A pure Nash equilibrium is a tuple );( Nnss n   such that each ns  maximizes ),ˆ( nn xxf  . By 
definition, any pure Nash equilibrium may be a mixed equilibrium as well as a correlated 
equilibrium. The sets of strategies mm SS   (with Nm ,...,1 ) are rationalizable if for all n  and 
nn Sx  , nx  maximizes )],([ nxfE   for some probability distribution on nx  with support in nS .
Furthermore, to be rationalizable, a strategy must belong to a rationalizable set. 
A strategy nx  is strongly dominated by another pure strategy nxˆ  if ),ˆ(),( nnnn xxfxxf    for all 
nx . Thus, it is rational to choose a dominating strategy over any dominated strategies. Given a 
product set Sˆ  of strategy profiles, the set of n ’s undominated responses to Sˆ  is defined by 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) { | '  and : ( , ) ( ', )}n n n n n n n n n n nU S x S x S x S f x x f x x       t . Denote the list of undominated 
responses for each player by ));ˆ(()ˆ( NnSUSU n  . Furthermore, let )ˆ(SU  denote the interval 
))]ˆ(sup()),ˆ([inf( SUSU .
U  may be used to represent the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Let us define 
SS  0  as the full set of strategy profiles, and )( 1 WW SUS  for 1tW . For all W , a strategy nx  is 
serially undominated if  )( WSUx nn  . These are the strategies that survive the iteration of strongly 
dominated strategies. This has significant importance since only the surviving serially undominated 
strategies are rationalizable and can be played with a positive probability at both a pure and mixed 
Nash equilibrium as well as at a correlated equilibrium. The remaining strategies form the 
dominance solution. If, at the end, there exists only one strategy that has survived iteration, the 
game is called dominance solvable. All serially undominated strategies lie in an interval ],[ xx  with 
supremum and infimum points being the largest and smallest Nash equilibria. 
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3.2. Example: Hollywood – Race to the A-List 
A slightly modified (and more superficial) version of the arms race game (O’Neill, 1986) is now 
used to demonstrate the characteristics of supermodular games. The setup is as follows: there are n
ugly sisters that are aspiring actresses and are eager to make a successful living out of acting in 
Hollywood. The sisters have taken sibling rivalry to another level: the only thing that matters is 
being more successful than the other sisters. All of them are fairly unknown, and none of them are 
particularly attractive in the classical Hollywood way. Using an analogy taken from tabloid 
magazines, in which celebrities are sorted into groups according to popularity, let us call the n
sisters/actresses, say, C-listers. They are aware that belonging to the A-list would greatly increase 
their earning potential. Even being a B-lister is desirable. 
As they are aware that although acting classes would help them, it is a lengthy process. Instead, they 
opt for plastic surgery for a more immediate remedy for their less-than-desired success because they 
– perhaps correctly – assume that beauty can take them a long way in Hollywood. 
Let us consider the case of two ugly sisters, or, players 1 and 2. Both sisters believe that whoever 
gets more plastic surgery is prettier and will get to the B-list and eventually to the A-list. Both 
sisters choose a level of plastic surgery, ],0[ maxxxn  . The payoffs they receive are 
)()(),( nnnnn xCxxBxxf   . The benefits from surgery, B , is a smooth concave function. The 
costs of surgery, C , is a smooth function of any form. Both sisters have identical payoffs, i.e., the 
game is symmetrical. The game is supermodular since 0)(''/ 21211
2 t ww xxBxxf .
Time can be modelled into this problem by extending it into a dynamic game in which plastic 
surgeries accumulate and years take their toll on the ugly sisters. The level of plastic surgeries 
accumulated at time t , )(txn , proceeds according to the dynamic function 
)()1()1()( tItxtx nnn  G . G  is the rate of depreciation of the sisters’ beauty, )(tI n  is the rate 
of investment in plastic surgeries at time t . The initial condition is 0)1(  nx . Suppose the payoffs 









t GU , 10 dd G ,  10 dd U ,
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where B  represents the advantages of superior looks and C  the cost of investing in plastic 
surgeries up until period T  which is when the sisters give up acting. B  is concave and increasing. 
C  is convex and increasing. Finally there is some I  such that nx  is feasible if and only if )(tI n  lies 
between ],0[ I  for all t . Each of the terms in the above sum satisfies supermodularity, increasing 
differences, and continuity (conditions (A2) – (A4)). According to Veinott (1989) the properties of 
supermodularity and increasing differences survive summation. The point-wise limit of a sequence 
of such functions also satisfies these conditions. In addition, condition (A1) can be verified in the 
following way. Strategy sets are regarded as subsets of the lattice })(0|{ Ittxx dd . The constraints 
on the strategy choices are 0)0(  nx  and 0)1()1()( tt txtxI nn G , for ,...2,1 t . It can be 
seen that each of the constraints individually describes a complete sublattice (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1990). All four conditions are satisfied and thus, the game is supermodular. 
The symmetric equilibrium strategy x  can be inferred from )]1(1/[)0('))((' GU   BtIC n  for all 
t . The pure symmetric equilibrium is unique if the game is dominance solvable. There is an interval 
],[ SS xx  containing x  at each stage s  in the dominance elimination process. All the remaining 
strategies x  must satisfy )()()( txtxtx SS dd  or be strongly dominated at that stage by the strategy 
SS xxx  )( . As s  increases, Sx  converge monotonically down to x . At the same time, 
strategies Sx  converge up to x . The result is that for both of the sisters the equilibrium strategy is 
x .
4. Concluding Remarks 
Supermodular optimization has increased its importance in game-theoretic modelling. Although the 
mathematics used – lattice theory – can be rather complex, potential theoretical applications are in 
abundance. Supermodular games can be helpful in describing situations in the fields of, for 
instance, industrial organization, military armament, matching markets and advertising. However, 
due to its very nature, the class of supermodular games does not easily – if at all – yield reasonable 
practical results with numerical estimates, unlike the simpler versions of non-cooperative games or 
characteristic function games (or TU-games), for instance. Thus far the groundbreaking work in the 
field of supermodular games has been theoretical. 
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